Abstract. Crowd-based ratings have become one of the most widely used forms of performance measurement. They inform customers, job seekers, and investors, provide firms with diagnostic feedback, and are increasingly tied to employee evaluation and pay. Accounting research, however, has paid little attention to how the design of these measurement systems shapes their quality. We examine a change in Amazon’s rating system that removed a small participation friction (“sludge”), the requirement to write a text review when submitting a star rating. Using 77 million product-week observations, we find that removing this friction broadened participation by previously silent, authentic customers and diluted the influence of paid raters, making rating manipulation less effective. Composite ratings became more informative. Their alignment with independent expert quality assessments strengthened, and the sensitivity of future sales to ratings nearly doubled. Our findings suggest that crowd-based performance measures are not passive aggregators of dispersed information; their informativeness depends critically on design choices that govern who participates in the measurement process.